Authoritarianism and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties

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Abstract: Recent research has identified the importance of dispositional factors on public opinion and party support in various political systems. This study examines the effect of authoritarianism—a disposition characterized by a high need for order, an adherence to traditional norms and social roles, and strong in-group attachment—on support for radical right parties in West European political systems. The programmatic emphasis of the radical right on the maintenance of national cohesion against immigration and multiculturalism, on the preservation of sovereignty against European integration, and (in some cases) on the maintenance of traditional ‘national’ values are likely to appeal to those scoring high in authoritarianism. However, prior research has found mixed evidence of a relationship between authoritarianism and radical right support using data from earlier eras. This study examines data from recent cross-national election studies to identify whether, and under what contextual circumstances, authoritarianism predicts support for radical right parties.
Understanding the sources of support for populist radical right (PRR) parties is important given that they are now the third-largest parties in a number of European party systems. Prior research has largely focused on the contextual determinants of PRR party support, examining whether unemployment or immigration levels (e.g., Knigge 1998, Lubbers et al 2002, Golder 2003, Jesuit et al 2009) or the political opportunity structure (e.g., Arzheimer 2009, Golder 2003, Norris 2005) affect support. Less is known about the individuals who vote for PRRs.

This study seeks to add to a small body of literature examining the individual traits that predict PRR support. Recent studies have found mixed evidence in favor of psychological arguments. Most recently, Dunn (2015) found that the authoritarian predisposition predicts PRR party support inconsistently across a five-country sample. The argument that authoritarianism predicts PRR party support is intuitive, so it is puzzling not to find a stronger relationship.

This paper attempts to develop a fuller account of the dispositional sources of PRR support. Similar to Dunn (2015), I expect that several characteristic traits associated with authoritarianism—strong in-group attachment, intolerance of difference (Adorno et al 1950; Altemeyer 1981, 1996; Feldman & Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Weiler 2009)—predict greater PRR support. However, other traits associated with authoritarianism—such as greater attachment to tradition and social conformity—make one less likely to support a PRR party. Thus, some aspects of authoritarianism increase support for PRR parties while other aspects decrease support. Whether a high authoritarian supports a PRR party may thus depend on which particular authoritarian values she endorses more strongly. I investigate this argument by analyzing PRR party support in recent years in relevant West European democracies and find support for this paper’s argument.
Authoritarianism and Radical Right Populist Parties

Authoritarianism and PRR parties have both been extensively studied in recent years. One result is a proliferation of definitions and (in the case of authoritarianism) measurement approaches. This section proceeds in three stages. First, I develop definitions of authoritarianism and of radical right populist (PRR) parties, respectively. Finally, I derive specific predictions about the relationship between authoritarianism and support for PRR parties in Western Europe.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism was developed as a concept to explain popular support for fascist regimes in Europe (Adorno et al 1950). Though early pioneering studies were soon criticized on conceptual and methodological grounds, the topic has remained influential in the study of political psychology. Later scholars have revised the concept and its measurement in various ways (e.g., Altemeyer 1981, 1996; Stenner 2005; Oesterreich 2005; Hetherington & Weiler 2009). As a result, there are a cluster of definitions that agree on several core traits while disagreeing on questions related to the origins of authoritarianism, how it is manifested in attitudes and behavior, and how to measure it. As Stenner (2009, 142) notes, “Scholars with widely varying notions of what authoritarianism is and where it comes from have long agreed on the broad contours of what it looks like and what it does” (emphasis original).

Authoritarianism is characterized by a high desire to maintain social order and conformity (Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Weiler 2009). To that end, authoritarians display several attitudinal and behavioral traits. The first trait is conventionalism, a pronounced tendency to adopt the shared values and behaviors of the dominant social group and to reject non-conformist behavior or values. A second trait is higher willingness to submit to established sources of authority, which could include political or religious leaders and texts or
simply “traditional values.” It also includes greater aggression towards those deviants and members of the out-group who challenge the conventional values of the in-group (as defined by established authorities) (see Adorno et al 1950; Altemeyer 1981, 1996). More broadly, authoritarianism is likely to manifest itself in higher levels of traditionalism, out-group hostility, intolerance of dissent, and support for the punishment of deviants. By contrast, low authoritarians display greater preference for preserving individual autonomy, reflected in higher tolerance for out-group members, deviance, dissent, and greater hostility towards sources of authority that tend to suppress them.

Authoritarianism is a disposition activated by perceived threat (Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Weiler 2009). In other words, attitudinal and behavioral differences between high authoritarians and low authoritarians only occur when certain types of threat are present. When there is no threat to society or its values, then high authoritarians should not behave differently than low authoritarians. In certain cases of extreme physical threat (such as in the aftermath of a terror attack), the attitudes of low authoritarians may converge with those of high authoritarians (Hetherington & Suhay 2011). When there is a “normative threat” (Stenner 2005) to social cohesion or values, then high authoritarians should endorse hostile attitudes to the source of that threat while low authoritarians will not. It is under these conditions that authoritarianism leads to observable differences in political attitudes and behavior.

Finally, it is important to note that authoritarianism is distinct from “status-quo conservatism” or “laissez-faire conservatism” (Stenner 2009). Under certain conditions, high authoritarians adopt conservative or “laissez-faire” attitudes. However, the authoritarian predisposition can lead to support for solidaristic economic policies and a strong regulatory state, which would normally be associated with the left (Stenner 2005, 2009; Malka et al 2014). Indeed,
one research tradition has debated the presence of “working-class authoritarianism” (e.g., Lipset 1960, Napier & Jost 2008), which would tend to lead to a combination of economically left-wing and cultural right-wing views. The effect of authoritarianism on economic attitudes may depend on the political context in each country (Malka et al 2014). In this study, most respondents live in West European countries with highly developed welfare states. High authoritarians should endorse these welfare states as part of the traditional political-economic arrangement of that society, while laissez-faire conservatives would naturally reject the welfare state.

The distinction between authoritarianism and “status-quo conservatism” (Stenner 2005, 2009) can be subtler to observe in principle but is equally important. The desire to maintain social order often leads high authoritarians to endorse essentially “conservative” attitudes or policies. In recent years, one would expect both high authoritarians and status-quo conservatives to oppose same-sex marriage as a policy that would re-order traditional social and moral arrangements. However, the differences between authoritarianism and conservatism should be evident in a willingness to subvert practices such as democracy in order to maintain social order or in a willingness to endorse policies that would enforce change in order to reverse the status quo to that of an earlier era.

**Populist Radical Right Parties**

I follow Mudde (2007) in defining populist radical right parties as having an ideological core centered on nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Each of these values is likely to be appeal to high authoritarians in the electorate. I explain each below.

Populist radical right parties are perhaps best known for an emphasis on nativism, or exclusive nationalism. A core feature of their platforms is a rejection of multiculturalism and
immigration in lieu of protecting the social cohesion and cultural traditions of the dominant nationality. Consider the following quotes from the party program of the Danish People’s Party:

[Denmark] is founded on the Danish cultural heritage and, therefore, Danish culture must be preserved and strengthened…Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society. Denmark belongs to the Danes.”

To the extent that PRR parties accept immigration, they emphasize that it must be conditional upon immigrants assimilating into the culture of that country so as not to disrupt social cohesion. This desire to protect and promote the dominant nationality is likely to appeal to high authoritarians, who display higher levels of in-group bias.

At first glance, the characterization of PRR parties as authoritarian would create a circular argument. In this context, authoritarianism describes the emphasis that PRR parties place on the maintenance of traditional values, strong “law and order” policies to deter and punish crime, and on the acceptance of a competitive and hierarchical society. In this last respect, PRR parties often call for social solidarity, but they also tend to promote market economies and schemes to encourage recipients of social welfare to work. High authoritarians are likely to endorse such policies, but the authoritarian values of the party are conceptually different than the authoritarian predisposition of the individual voters being considered here.

Finally, PRR parties tend to endorse populism, referring to a belief in the “general will” of the ordinary citizenry as opposed to corrupt political elites. Typically, PRR parties promote direct democracy and other policies designed to return power to the people. Populism also involves attacking all mainstream parties as being collusive, which can be reinforced when those  

parties attempt to establish a *cordon sanitaire* to exclude PRR parties from government. To some extent, these policies and rhetoric are likely to appeal to high authoritarians. However, efforts to cast themselves as political outsiders or challenger parties may not appeal to high authoritarians, who are more attached to tradition and conformity than other voters.

**Explaining Support**

Why would authoritarianism predict support for PRR parties? The literature on authoritarianism provides competing expectations. Specifically, certain aspects of the authoritarian predisposition should lead to higher support for PRR parties, while other aspects would predict that high authoritarians would not support PRR parties. Thus, a positive association between authoritarianism and PRR support is likely to be conditional. In addition, this study assumes that authoritarianism has a direct effect on socio-cultural attitudes while its effect on economic attitudes is more likely to be context-dependent (Malka et al 2014).

Two particular aspects of the authoritarian predisposition are likely to predict support for PRR parties. First is the high sensitivity to threats to the social order. Authoritarians are sensitive to threats to social cohesion and will value the maintenance of order. PRR parties typically appeal to this predisposition, by emphasizing the defense of national community from mass immigration, by advocating tougher measures to fight crime, by demanding that immigrant populations assimilate to local cultural practices, and by promoting national sovereignty over European integration. Second, high authoritarians tend to display greater intolerance of difference. This intolerance translates into less acceptance of outgroups and deviants, or greater preference for conformity and members of the in-group. PRR parties appeal to this predisposition through opposition to immigration or demands that immigrants assimilate. In addition, some PRR parties adopt socially conservative platforms that promote traditional religious values,
though others adopt liberal stances that PRR party leaders argue stand in contrast to the repressive values of Muslim immigrants.

Two aspects of the authoritarian predisposition are also likely to predict reduced support for PRR parties. First, high authoritarians tend to trust in established authorities. In West European democracies, mainstream party families have formed the backbone of the legitimate political order in the postwar era. By contrast, PRR parties are frequently new, present themselves as challengers to the mainstream, and are often depicted as extreme by the media and mainstream party rivals. These characteristics would make high authoritarians less likely to vote for PRR parties. Research in other contexts has shown that high authoritarians are sensitive to social norms, adjusting their attitudes to conform to widely shared values (Oyamot et al 2012). Second, and on a somewhat related point, high authoritarians have a high need for order and tradition. To that extent, they are more likely to retain support for established parties and to be less likely to switch loyalties to a new and untested party. Both of these factors tend to predict that high authoritarians are unlikely to vote for PRR parties.

These factors may also suggest conditions under which high authoritarians are more likely to support PRR parties. With two factors pushing high authoritarians to support PRR parties and two factors push high authoritarians not to support PRR parties, the preceding discussion offers no clear prediction. However, the latter factors suggest a conditional relationship: high authoritarians are less likely to support PRR parties as long as they are viewed being extreme and not part of the established order. As PRR parties become accepted as part of the established party system, then there is less reason for high authoritarians not to support them. In this respect, high authoritarians may be “late joiners,” shifting their support to PRR parties as it becomes more socially acceptable to do so. For the purposes of the present study, I expect
Universalism (reversed effect) and Security to predict PRR party support, while Conformity and Traditionalism should reduce PRR party support.

Analysis

Authoritarianism and PRR Party Support

I use data from several recent academic national surveys: the 2013 Austrian Election Study (AES), British Election Study Panel Survey (BES) conducted in January 2014 (from which I include respondents living in England), and the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) wave conducted in May 2013.²

In each study, the dependent variable is a binary measure of whether the respondent voted for a PRR party or not. The relevant parties are the Freedom Party (Austria), UK Independence Party (Britain), and the Alternative for Germany (Germany).

I use several scales to measure authoritarianism. Most contemporary studies of authoritarianism use questions measuring preferences about child-rearing values (e.g., Feldman & Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005, Hetherington & Weiler 2009). In addition to capturing the underlying construct effectively, these child-rearing questions also have the advantage of not measuring contemporary political values and presumably being causally prior to political attitudes. Such questions are included in the GLES survey, which asks respondents to choose between paired items indicating preferences for child-rearing values. Respondents were asked to indicate which characteristic is more desirable: (1) respect for elders or independence; (2) obedience or self-reliance; (3) good manners or curiosity. In each case, authoritarian responses are coded as 1 (the first alternative in each pairing) and non-authoritarian responses are coded as

² This is a work in progress, and I intend to update with more cases. Of course, some national and cross-national election surveys lack the necessary questions to measure authoritarianism.
Responses to these three questions are averaged to generate a scale ranging from -1 (low authoritarian) to 1 (high authoritarian). I expect this variable to have a positive coefficient on support for PRR parties.

Authoritarianism has often been measured using responses to contemporary (or enduring) socio-political questions. For example, the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer 1981, 1996) includes items measuring respondent attitudes towards punitiveness, deviance, conformity, and obedience in society today. While these questions have the disadvantage of potentially being correlated with attitudes towards contemporary political questions, they effectively measure the underlying construct. As this study examines the effects of authoritarianism on party support, the nature of these questions is less likely to contaminate the results. Importantly, none of these questions measures attitudes towards immigration or the European Union, which are typically core issues for PRR parties. These questions measuring RWA (or what I would term “authoritarian values”) are available in the BES data. Five questions are included. These ask respondents to indicate their level of agreement on a five-point scale (with 1 meaning “strongly disagree” and 5 meaning “strongly agree”) to the following statements: “Young people today do not have enough respect for British values;” “For some crimes, the death penalty is most appropriate;” “Schools should teach children to obey authority;” “Censorship is necessary to uphold moral values;” and “People who break the law should get stiffer sentences.” Agreement with each of these five statements indicates endorsement of authoritarian values.

The 2013 Austrian Election Study data include a similar battery of six questions, also measured on a five-point scale. These statements are: “we should be grateful for leaders who tell us exactly what to do;” “the age in which discipline and obedience for authority are some of the most important values should be over” (reversed); “our society for once has to crack down
harder on criminals;” “our country needs people who oppose traditions and try out different ideas” (reversed); and “this country would flourish if people paid more attention to traditions and values.” Agreement with each statement (disagreement with the two that are reversed) indicates endorsement of authoritarian values.

Finally, the 2014 European Election Study includes three questions that can be used to measure authoritarian values. The first asks respondents to place themselves on a 0-10 scale indicating opposition or support for same-sex marriage. The second asks respondents whether they prefer to protect individual privacy rights or to fight crime. The third asks whether protecting the environment should take precedence over economic growth, or vice versa. In each case, the authoritarian response (opposition to same-sex marriage, fight crime, prioritize economic growth) is coded 10 while the non-authoritarian response (support for same-sex marriage, protect privacy rights, prioritize environmental protection) is coded 0.

I include a number of control variables. I include a measure of the respondent’s assessment of the state of the national economy. Negative assessments of the national economy may increase support for PRR parties. Self-reported ideology is also included as a control. Though the left-right position of PRR parties is uncertain (particularly on economic questions), I expect a positive coefficient as more right-wing self-assessments are associated with a greater likelihood of voting for PRR parties.

I include several control variables measuring respondent characteristics. Education indicates self-reported educational attainment, and Income measures household income. Both variables, as indicators of “human capital” (Gabel 1998), should correlate negatively with support for PRR parties. I also include a dummy variable for current students, retirees, the self-
employed, and unemployed. I include measures for the respondent’s age and gender. Older voters and males should be more likely to vote for PRR parties.

The results are presented in Table 1. In all three cases, Authoritarianism is positive and significant. High authoritarians are more likely to vote for PRR parties. This result is consistent with expectations, and it suggests that dispositional traits may play an important role in shaping party support. Although this analysis does not fully replicate earlier studies’ country coverage, it does suggest that the link between authoritarianism and PRR party support is stronger in 2013-14 than it was in earlier years. Notably, though, this study finds evidence that authoritarianism predicts support for the Freedom Party of Austria, which previous studies had not found (Dunn 2015). These results are suggestive of a strong relationship between authoritarianism and PRR party support in recent years.

These findings do not provide much insight into why high authoritarians are more likely to vote for PRR parties—and why this relationship is stronger now than in earlier years. To address that question, I turn to a different data source that allows us to disaggregate the concept of authoritarianism into finer-grained measures of specific values.

Authoritarian Values and Support for PRR Parties

I use data from Round 6 of the European Social Survey (ESS), collected in 2012. The ESS data are appropriate for this study, as they cover a wide range of countries, include relevant measures of party support, and—crucially—contain potentially nuanced measures of authoritarianism.

The dependent variable is a binary variable measuring whether the respondent voted for a PRR party or not. Not all countries in the sample have PRR parties, and not all PRR parties are coded in the data. As a result, I examine the following six countries that have an available PRR
party for the full time coverage of the data (PRR party in parentheses): Belgium (Vlaams Belang, Front National), Finland (True Finns), France (Front National), Netherlands (Party for Freedom, Fortuyn List), Norway (Progress Party), and Switzerland (Swiss People’s Party). These are distinct from the countries analyzed above.

The key independent variable measures different aspects of authoritarianism using the Schwartz Human Values Scale (HVS). The HVS measures ten dimensions of human values, which are purported to cover the ten different core sets of values. The HVS is constructed by including two questions measuring each dimension. Four of these values measure relevant components of authoritarianism. First, universalism measures the degree to which the respondent promotes equal treatment of all individuals as opposed to endorsing preferential treatment of in-group members. In this case, the dimension is reverse-coded, as high authoritarians should not endorse universalistic values. Therefore, universalism should have a negative effect on support for PRR parties. Second, security measures the extent to which respondents prefer to live in a secure environment and, to that end, endorse the use of tough measures by authority to maintain personal and collective security. High authoritarians should endorse these values, and so security should positively predict support for PRR parties. Third, conformity values measure the extent to which the respondent believes that individuals should adhere to the dominant behaviors and beliefs in their community as opposed to expressing their individualism. High authoritarians should be likely to endorse conformity values. However, conformity may not predict support for PRR parties. Because PRR parties are often positioned as challenger or extremist parties, those scoring high in conformity should be less likely to vote for

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3 This study does not offer a suggestion of whether authoritarianism is conceptually prior to values or not. Recent studies (e.g., Stenner 2005, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Hetherington & Weiler 2009) treat authoritarianism as a disposition rather than as a set of values, suggesting that it is conceptually prior. For this study, that distinction is not important.
a PRR party. Only to the extent that PRR parties become “normalized” as mainstream parties would high conformity respondents be likely to vote for PRR parties. Finally, traditionalism reflects a similar set of adherence to authoritative, long-standing beliefs and behaviors shared by society. High authoritarians should be more likely to endorse traditionalism. Similar to conformity, those scoring high in traditionalism should be less likely to vote for new PRR parties in lieu of mainstream parties.

I include a number of control variables in the analysis. First, I control for religious affiliation with binary variables indicating whether the respondent was Catholic or Protestant, respectively. I also include a variable measuring religiosity, which asks the respondent to place him- or herself on a 0-10 scale where 0 indicates “not at all religious” and 10 indicates “very religious.” Religiosity and self-declared religious affiliation should both reduce support for PRR parties. I measure “human capital” with several binary variables measuring whether the respondent is currently a student, retired, or self-employed. Students should be less likely to support PRR parties, while the self-employed may be more likely. I measure self-reported household income on nation-specific scales devised by the ESS ranging from 1 to 12 in the first three rounds and 1 to 10 in the latter three rounds. Higher incomes should reduce support for PRR parties. Education is measured on a four-point scale, ranging from less than secondary to university education. Higher education should reduce PRR party support. Finally, I control for gender and age. Men should be more likely than women to support PRR parties, while younger voters with weaker attachment to mainstream parties may be more likely to vote for PRR parties.

I estimate a hierarchical linear model using logistic regression with the respondent’s country serving as the level 2 variable. This method allows the intercept term to vary for each country, but I do not interact any level 1 variables with the level 2 measure. The results are
shown in Table 2. The estimates generally fit expectations. Universalism is negative and significant, indicating that those scoring high on this value are less likely to vote for a PRR party. Put differently, this result is consistent with the expectation that those who display greater in-group bias are more likely to vote for a PRR party. Security is positive and significant. Individuals who place more value on defending against threats to personal safety and the social order are more likely to vote for a PRR party. Traditionalism and Conformity are not significant. This finding suggests that conventionalism—often described as one of the three main characteristics of authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer 1996)—does not affect support for PRR parties.

These results are useful in allowing us to disentangle the possible relationship between authoritarianism and PRR party support. The results suggest that the main values driving support for PRR parties are high sensitivity to social and personal threats (security) and higher bias towards members of the in-group over out-group members (universalism). By contrast, deference for established authorities (traditionalism) and adherence to socially accepted values and behavior (conformity) have no effect. The underlying motivation driving support for PRR parties may be the sense that those policies opposed by PRR parties—immigration and European integration—are making communities less secure (e.g., by increasing crime or the threat of terrorism) and are privileging foreigners over citizens (e.g., by providing welfare to immigrants or by increasing international competition for jobs). However, PRR party support does not seem to be linked to concerns about the erosion of traditional social norms or values.

Discussion
This paper examines whether authoritarianism predicts support for radical right populist parties. Prior research on this question has found mixed results (Dunn 2015), which is surprising given that the PRR parties often emphasize issues that would appeal naturally to high authoritarians. Moreover, PRR parties are described as having authoritarian characteristics (Mudde 2007), so one would expect that their voters to display authoritarian dispositional traits. This study sought to examine whether these findings—observed using survey data from around 2007—remain true in recent years and to understand what aspects of the authoritarian disposition shape PRR party support.

The analysis used data from several national election studies and from the European Social Survey. The results show that authoritarianism, broadly measured, predicts PRR party support in several individual country cases. Further analysis suggests that a strong orientation toward security and in-group preference are the main factors driving the relationship between authoritarianism and PRR party support. Traditionalism and conventionalism have no effect. These results clarify our understanding of why high authoritarians support PRR parties. Concerns about increased threats to society and the preferential treatment of out-group members seem to be the main drivers of PRR party support. A desire to maintain established social values or to maintain conformity do not relate to PRR support.

I argue that this latter result is because PRR parties often present themselves as challengers against a corrupt and collusive mainstream while the mainstream in turn often portrays PRR parties as extreme. Highly conventional voters are less likely to switch their support from one of the established parties to a new challenger party that is labeled as extreme. This finding could suggest that PRR parties benefit from normalization. When mainstream parties either form governments with PRR parties or attempt to co-opt their rhetoric or policies,
they may encourage voters scoring high on Conformity to vote for PRR parties. This idea should be explored in future research.
References


Table 1. Authoritarianism and Vote for Radical Right Populist Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Austria 2013</th>
<th>Britain 2014</th>
<th>Germany 2014</th>
<th>European Election Study 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.853* (.249)</td>
<td>.721** (.059)</td>
<td>.489* (.248)</td>
<td>.064* (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Ideology</td>
<td>.238** (.081)</td>
<td>.227** (.017)</td>
<td>.382** (.072)</td>
<td>.269** (.023)</td>
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<td>Retrospective Economy</td>
<td>-.173 (.167)</td>
<td>-.222** (.033)</td>
<td>-.433* (.170)</td>
<td>-.167** (.053)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.196 (.169)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-.039 (.186)</td>
<td>-.090 (.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.202 (.284)</td>
<td>-.367** (.070)</td>
<td>-.780* (.323)</td>
<td>-.498** (.094)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.033 (.134)</td>
<td>.117** (.038)</td>
<td>-.299* (.146)</td>
<td>.071 (.044)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>-.629* (.253)</td>
<td>-.231** (.049)</td>
<td>-.150 (.222)</td>
<td>-.009 (.069)</td>
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<td>Manual Worker</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.380** (.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>-.152 (1.24)</td>
<td>.270 (.569)</td>
<td>-.237* (1.07)</td>
<td>.267 (.272)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>.127 (.115)</td>
<td>-.362 (.841)</td>
<td>.280 (.204)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-1.25** (.426)</td>
<td>-.052 (.096)</td>
<td>-.487 (.585)</td>
<td>.098 (.150)</td>
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<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>.356 (.472)</td>
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<td>.551 (.558)</td>
<td>.066 (.193)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.080** (.031)</td>
<td>-.015 (.012)</td>
<td>.009 (.063)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.80 (1.29)</td>
<td>-5.29** (.334)</td>
<td>-2.21* (1.07)</td>
<td>-2.11** (.419)</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>10147</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>10,190</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-2</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>----</td>
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* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)  
All models report logistic regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) using Stata 13.
Table 2. Components of Authoritarianism and Radical Right Populist Party Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-.406** (.063)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.225** (.052)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>-.060 (.046)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditionalism</td>
<td>.095 (.049)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.105 (.135)</td>
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<td>Protestant</td>
<td>.045 (.101)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.065** (.015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.546** (.083)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.083* (.036)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.458** (.050)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>-.944** (.222)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-.233 (.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-.274* (.122)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>.042 (.116)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>.006 (.092)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.082** (.017)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.576* (.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>.195 (.113)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)
Multi-level logistic regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) using Stata 13.